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STATE OWNERSHIP IN THE MARGINAL SEA
AROUND THE CHANNEL ISLANDS NATIONAL
MONUMENT
Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act (SLA) of 19531 to end
growing disagreement over ownership of the mineral-rich lands2 be-
neath United States coastal waters.3 Under the SLA, the states pos-
sess ownership rights4 to the submerged land which extends three
miles' into the ocean,6 excepting land occupied by the federal gov-
I. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1970). See Overfelt, Submerged Lands Act of 1953-
In Retrospect, 24 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 208 (1955-56).
2 Comment, Constitutional Law: Does National Sovereignty Encompass Federal
Provretor;' Rights on the Marginal Sea?, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 231 (1975). Oil is the
primary resource in offshore submerged land. In 1953, a Congressional committee
considered a geological survey estimate of 15.156 billion barrels to be the total United
States offshore oil reserves. H.R. MIN. REP. ON H.R. REP. No. 4198, 83d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1953), reprinted in [1953] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1464, 1465. Reliable
1968 estimates of potentially recoverable crude oil in the Outer Continental Shelf
indicated 165 billion barrels, or about II times the 1953 estimates. U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, TECH. BULL. No. 5, THE ROLE OF THE PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS
FROM THE OUTER SHELF IN THE NATIONAL SUPPLY OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL
GAS 49 (1970).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 1778, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1953] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1415, 1420 (chronicles in detail the disagreement).
4. The SLA provides in part:
It is determined and declared to be in the public interest that (1) title to and
ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the
respective States, and the natural resources within such lands and waters, and (2)
the right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said lands
and natural resources all in accordance with applicable State law be. . .vested
in . . . the respective States ...
43 U.S.C. § 131 l(a) (1976). Section 131 l(d), however, provides that nothing in the
SLA "shall affect the use, development, improvement, or control by or under the
constitutional authority of the United States of said lands and waters for the purposes
of navigation or flood control or the production of power. .43 U.S.C. § 131 1(d)
(1976).
5. "One English, statute, or land mile equals approximately .87 geographical,
marine, or nautical miles. The conventional 'three-mile limit' under international law
refers to three geographical miles, or approximately 3.45 land miles." United States
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ernment under a claim of right.7 Instead of resolving the ownership
controversy, the SLA has ignited a series of disputes between the
states and the federal government.' In the most recent suit, United
States v. Calfornia,9 the Supreme Court uncharacteristically ex-
panded state ownership rights by rejecting the federal government's
claim of right' ° to an area of submerged land off the California coast.
v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 148 n.8 (1965). Unless otherwise indicated in this Com-
ment, "mile" refers to a geographic mile.
6. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1970). This provision allowed Gulf coast states an oppor-
tunity to establish historic boundaries that extend up to 10 miles from their shore-
lines. Only Texas and Florida, however, qualify for this extension. See notes 54-59
and accompanying text infra.
7. 43 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (1976). The provision states in part that the Act does not
apply to "any rights the United States has in lands presently and actually occupied by
the United States under claim of right."
8. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975) (the federal government, rather
than the Atlantic coast states, controls the submerged land beyond the three-mile
zone); United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 1 (1969) (the boundary line of Texas must
be measured from the state's modern, rather than historic, coastline); United States v.
Louisiana, 389 U.S. 155 (1967) (artificial jetties can not be considered a part of the
shoreline from which to measure the three-mile limit); United States v. California,
381 U.S. 139 (1965) (the court defined inland waters, a term necessary to determine
where a state's coastline ends); United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960) (Texas,
but not Louisiana, Mississippi, or Alabama, qualifies for a boundary extension be-
yond three miles).
9. 436 U.S. 32 (1978). This case is the most recent stage of ongoing litigation
between the United States and the State of California. The first action took place in
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). For a discussion of this decision, see
notes 35-41 and accompanying text infra. The court entered a decree for the 1947
decision in the same year, 332 U.S. 804 (1947). The court rendered a second decision
in 1965, 381 U.S. 139, and a supplemental decree to the decision in 1966, 382 U.S.
448. For a discussion of the 1965 decision, see notes 65-69 and accompanying text
infra. The court entered a second supplemental decree in 1977, 432 U.S. 40, to clarify
the boundary lines off the California coast. A third supplemental decree affirmed the
Court's decision in the 1978 case. See 439 U.S. 30 (1978).
All cases arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. "In all Cases...
in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction."
U.S. CONsT. art. 3, § 2, cl. 2. In each decree the Supreme Court reserved jurisdiction
to enter such further orders as may from time to time be deemed advisable or neces-
sary to give full force and effect to the decree. California initiated the present suit
under the 1966 reservation of jurisdiction. The 1966 decree provided in part:
As to any portion of such boundary line or of any areas claimed to have been
reserved under § 5 of the Submerged Lands Act as to which the parties may be
unable to agree, either party may apply to the Court at any time for entry of a
further supplemental decree.
382 U.S. at 453.
10. See notes 76-81 and accompanying text infra.
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A 1938 Presidential Proclamation" t designated two islands'2 off the
California coast as the Channel Islands National Monument. 13 The
Proclamation's purpose was to preserve unusual fossil formations
and other objects of geologic interest located on the islands.' 4 The
discovery of rare and endangered marine life' 5 prompted a second
Presidential Proclamation in 194916 which expanded the Monument
11. Presidential Proclamation No. 2281, 3 Fed. Reg. 827 (1938). Franklin
Roosevelt "reserved from all forms of appropriation under the public-land laws"
most of the land on two islands, Santa Barbara and Anacapa. He set aside portions of
the islands for continued lighthouse purposes. The area reserved for the national
monument is about 538 acres on Anacapa Island and about 581 acres on Santa Bar-
bara Island. Id
Federal title to the islands can be traced to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9
Stat. 922 (1848). Mexico ceded to the United States the islands lying off the coast of
California, along with the adjacent mainland. When the United States admitted Cali-
lornia to the Union in 1850, the federal government retained control over the islands.
See An Act for the Admission of the State of California into the Union, 9 Stat. 452
(1850). See generalr Bowman, The Question of Sovereignty over Caiffornia's Off-
Shore Islands, 31 PAC. Hist. REV. 291 (1962) (Bowman discusses whether the federal
government does hold the lawful title to the islands).
12 The islands, Santa Barbara and Anacapa, are located about 15 miles off the
California coast, just south of Los Angeles. NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC ATLAS OF THE
WORLD 38 (1975). The three-mile limit still applies to these islands, however, because
the Supreme Court held in the 1965 California case that California owns the waters
and submerged land within three miles of each of the many islands off the coast. 381
U.S at 177.
13. The Antiquities Act of 1906 authorizes the President to reserve lands "owned
and controlled by the Government of the United States" for use as national monu-
ments 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976). The Act provides in part:
The President of the United States is authorized, in his discretion, to declare by
public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and
other objects of histonc and scientific interest that are situated upon the lands
owned or controlled by the Government of the United States to be national mon-
uments, and may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in
all cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care
and management of the objects to be protected.
16 U S.C, §431 (1976).
14. The Proclamation states that the islands contain "fossils of Pleistocene ele-
phants and ancient trees, and furnish noteworthy examples of ancient volcanism, dep-
osition, and active sea erosion, and have situated thereon various other objects of
geological and scientific interest." Presidential Proclamation No, 2281, 3 Fed. Reg.
827 (1938).
15. The surrounding waters contain endangered sea otters, sea elephants, and fur
seals Memorandum from Victor Cahalene, Representative of the National Park
Wildlife Service, to Ben Thompson, Fish and Wildlife Service (Jan. 30, 1941).
16 Presidential Proclamation No. 2825, 3 C.F.R. 17 (Supp. 1949). President
Harry Truman proclaimed that "the areas within one nautical mile of Anacapa and
Santa Barbara Island. . .are withdrawn from all forms of appropriation under the
1980]
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to include the waters and submerged land within one mile of the is-
lands. 7 The California case arose after the United States interfered
with California's efforts to lease to commercial fishermen the rights to
harvest kelp'" found abundantly within the one-mile area.' 9 The
federal government invoked its long-standing policy of denying po-
tentially harmful intruders, especially kelp fishermen, access to the
area.2' The United States argued that under the 1949 Proclamation it
public-land laws and added to and reserved as a part of the Channel Islands National
Monument." Id The parties in the 1978 Caifornia decision devoted a considerable
portion of their briefs to a discussion of what the President intended when he used the
word "areas" in the Proclamation. Rather than resolve this controversy, the Supreme
Court assumed that even if "areas" included the submerged land, California still
owns the one-mile belts. 436 U.S. at 37.
17. Although the Antiquities Act only refers to "lands," the Supreme Court recog-
nizes that it now authorizes the President to reserve waters located on or over any
federally owned land. 436 U.S. at 36 n.9. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S.
128 (1975) (the Antiquities Act authorizes the President to reserve an underground
pool since that pool and its inhabitants are "objects of historic and scientific interest"
within the meaning of the Act); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1934) (an Execu-
tive Order setting aside a non-navigable lake on public domain as a bird sanctuary
was within the President's authority).
As early as 1941, the federal government emphasized the need to enlarge the monu-
ment. Early drafts of the Proclamation acknowledged an intent to protect the waters'
marine life. The federal government deleted such references, however, when George
T. Washington, the Assistant Attorney General, expressed doubts about whether the
Antiquities Act permitted the establishment or the enlargement of a national monu-
ment to protect plant and marine life. Letter from George T. Washington to the At-
torney General (Jan. 28, 1949).
18. Kelp refers to a mass or growth of large brown seaweeds. WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1236 (14th ed. 1966). Giant kelp known as
Macrocystis grow in the waters along portions of the California coast. Fishermen
harvest them for various substances, including algin, a chemical used for several com-
mercial purposes. 436 U.S. at 35 n.8. See Zahl, A/gae: The Lffe-Givers, 145 NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC 361 (1974); North, Giant Kelp, Sequoias of the Sea, 142 NAT'L GEO-
GRAPHIC 251 (1972).
19. The original drafters of the SLA noted that in 1945 commercial fishermen
harvested 37,542 tons of kelp under state leases. H.R. REP. No. 1778, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess., reprintedin [1953] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1415, 1435. The Department
of Agriculture remarked in 1911 that "the giant kelp beds of the Pacific coast are...
a national asset of first importance." S. Doc. No. 190, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in [1953] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1415, 1435.
20. In 1950, the acting regional director for the National Parks Service, whose
duties included supervision of the islands, noted the potential problem with kelp
fishermen. Letter from C. Persons, acting regional director, to Superintendent, Se-
quoia and Kings Canyon (July 20, 1950). The acting director remarked that "the kelp
beds are essential for wildlife protection and should not be disturbed." Id Since
then, other officials of the National Parks Service have made similar remarks. Joint
Appendix at 78-82, United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32 (1978).
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should control the one-mile belts.2 Rejecting this position, the Court
concluded that since the disputed area fell within the SLA's three-
mile zone,22 Congress intended that California own the waters and
submerged land.23
The SLA is the outgrowth of early cases2 4 where the Supreme
21. 436 U.S. at 39-40.
22. See note 12 supra.
23. 436 U.S. at 41.
24. The first case was Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842)
(alter the Revolution, the people of each state became themselves sovereign, thereby
possessing the absolute right to all their navigable waters and soils under the waters).
The most notable case, however, is Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212
(1845). The Court held that title to Alabama's tidelands belonged to Alabama. The
Court decided that the federal government held the title to the land in public trust
until the territory gained statehood. A state entering the Union retained most of the
sovereign rights it possessed before entering the Union, including title to the tide-
lands. Id at 229.
In several other cases, the Supreme Court followed the general holding of Pollard's
Lessee. See, e.g., United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931) (title to the beds of navi-
gable rivers passed to Utah when it entered the Union); Appleby v. City of New York,
271 U.S. 364 (1926) (after the Revolution, the Crown's proprietary rights in tidewaters
vested in the original states); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922) (upon creation
of a state, ownership of beds of navigable streams within the state passes from the
United States to that state); Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Washington R.R., 255 U.S. 56
(1921) (the navigable waters in the State of Washington and the lands under them
passed to Washington when it joined the Union); The Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. 166
(1912) (Congress has no control over sponges growing on land beneath tidewaters
within a state's jurisdiction); United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391 (1903)
(California, when admitted to the Union, received full ownership rights to the soils
under its navigable tidewaters); Mobile Transp. Co. v. Mobile, 187 U.S. 479 (1903)
(the court reaffirmed that Alabama, when admitted to the Union, became entitled to
the soil under the navigable waters below the high-water mark); St. Anthony Falls
Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm'rs, 168 U.S. 349 (1897) (the rights of a
riparian owner of land situated on the Mississippi River are to be measured by the
rules and decisions of the court located within that state); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1 (1893) (the original 13 states possess the ownership rights to tidewaters previously
held by England); Illinois Cent. R.R., v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (it is settled law
that the state owns the submerged land within the limits of that state); Hardin v.
Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891) (the extent of a state's prerogative over its submerged
land depends on the laws of that state); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240
(1891) (a state may define the boundaries of its submerged land within the generally
recognized territorial limits of that state); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876)
(each state owns the beds of all tidewaters within its jurisdiction); Weber v. Board of
Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873) (California has absolute property
rights in and sovereignty over all soils under tidewaters within the state's limits);
Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423 (1867) (when the Revolution took place,
the people of each state became themselves sovereign, thereby holding the absolute
right to all their navigable waters and soils under them); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S.
1980]
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Court has held that the original thirteen states own their navigable
inland waters 5 and submerged land. All states, including California,
now enjoy similar rights.26 None of these early decisions 7 involved
disputes over ownership rights to the marginal sea (the area within
three miles of the coastline).2 8 Nevertheless, legal commentators
noted that the cases supported a widespread belief that state owner-
ship extended three miles into the ocean.29 Not until 193730 did the
(18 How.) 71 (1855) (the soil below the low-water mark in the Chesapeake Bay,
within the boundaries of Maryland, belongs to Maryland); Den v. Jersey Co., 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 426 (1853) (the soil under the public navigable waters of East New Jersey
belongs to that state); Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 471 (1850) (Congress
cannot grant the lands under Alabama's navigable rivers to anyone, since Alabama
retains sovereignty over the area).
25. Inland waters are those over which a state may exercise sovereignty as if the
waters were part of the land mass, such as rivers and bays. Taylor, The Settlement
Between Federal and State Governments Concerning Offshore Petroleum Resources:
4ccommodation or .4djudication? I 1 HARV. INT'L L.J. 358, 359 (1970).
26. The equal-footing doctrine allows states, besides the original 13, to join the
Union with all the rights and privileges enjoyed by the original states. Equality
among the original states was first recognized in the Ordinance for the Government of
the Territory of the United States Northwest of the River Ohio, passed by the Con-
gress of the Confederation, 1787, readopted by Ist Cong., 1st Sess., I Stat. 51 (1789).
The equal-footing statute extending these rights to California is An Act for the Ad-
mission of the State of California into the Union, 9 Stat. 452 (1850).
See Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873) (upon admis-
sion of California into the Union under the equal-footing doctrine, sovereignty over
all soils under tidewaters within the state's boundaries passed to California). See also
Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935) (the federal government re-
served the soils under tidelands within the original states for those respective states.
New states admitted to the Union receive the same type of sovereignty to the lands
within their borders as the original 13 states enjoyed); United States v. Oregon, 295
U.S. 1 (1935) (when a state joins the Union, the United States' title to lands underly-
ing navigable waters within the state passes to that state). See generally Comment,
Equal Footing and the Marginal Sea, 19 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 66 (1951).
27. See S. MiN. REP. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1953] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1534, 1619 (remarks of Phillip B. Perlman, then Solicitor Gen-
eral of the United States) (the holding of Pollard's Lessee does not apply to sub-
merged land in the marginal sea).
28. The three-mile zone often is referred to as the marginal or the territorial sea.
See 29 U. CIN. L. REV. 510, 511 n.8 (1960).
29. See Hanna, The Submerged Land Cases, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 201, 209 (1951);
Metcalfe, The Tidelands Controversy: 4 Study in Development of a Political-Legal
Problem, 4 SYRACUSE L. REV. 39,41 (1952-1953). In 1953, a Congressional report on
the submerged lands controversy concluded in part that between 1842 and 1935 more
than 30 Supreme Court decisions announced the principle that the states owned the
soils under all navigable waters, regardless of whether the waters were inland. H.R.
REP. No. 1778, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1953] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1415, 1438. While many scholars held this belief, there was evidence to support
[Vol. 18:313
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United States first contest state ownership of the marginal sea. The
discovery of enormous deposits of oil, minerals, and other natural
resources aroused the government's economic interest in preventing
foreign exploitation.3' President Harry Truman issued two Procla-
mations 2 calling for exclusive United States control over the waters
and submerged land extending to the outer edge of the Continental
Shelf." Despite such federal claims, the states maintained that they
the government's position. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, in a note to the Brit-
ish Ambassador to the United States, advanced the first official American claim for a
three-mile zone. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the British Ambassador (1793),
H R. EXEC. Doc. No. 324, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 553, 553-554 (1872).
30. Senator Nye introduced Senate Bill 2164, which called for United States con-
trol over the marginal sea. S. 2164, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings before the House
Comm. on the Judiciari on SJ Res. 208, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1938). The federal
government, while recognizing state ownership of tidelands and lands beneath navi-
gable waters. claimed title to submerged lands lying seaward of the coastline. Id
31 The discovery of oil in the submerged land beneath the Santa Barbara Chan-
nel occured in 1894. Unsophisticated drilling techniques, however, prevented the ex-
traction of any oil until the 1920's. Metcalfe, The Tidelands Controversy: A Study in
Development qf a Political-Legal Problem, 4 SYRACUSE L. REV. 39 (1952-1953). See
Hearings before Subcomm. 4 of the Comm. on the Judiciary on H.J. Res. 181, 76th
Cong. Ist Sess. 50 (1939).
32 Presidential Proclamation No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1943-1948 Compilation);
Exec Order No. 9634, 3 C.F.R. 437 (1943-1948 Compilation) accompanied this Proc-
lamation, Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Compilation);
Exec Order No. 9633, 3 C.F.R. 437 (1943-1948 Compilation) accompanied this Proc-
lamation. Proclamation No. 2667 asserted United States' jurisdiction and control
over the natural resources in the Continental Shelf contiguous to the United States. It
sought to conserve the shelf resources, to protect the United States from foreign ex-
ploitation of the resources, and to promote domestic development among United
States industries in offshore mining. The Executive Order accompanying the Procla-
mation stated that the President was not attempting to affect "the determination by
legislation or judicial decree of any issues between the United States and the several
states, relating to the ownership or control of the subsoil and sea bed of the Continen-
tal Shelf within or outside the three-mile limit." Exec. Order No. 9633. Proclamation
No. 2668 announced the United States' right to establish conservation zones for the
protection of fisheries in certain areas of the high seas contiguous to the United States.
These zones were areas where fishing had been or would be maintained in large scale.
See Hollick, US Oceans Policy: The Truman Proclamations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 23
(1976)
33 The Continental Shelf refers to those slightly submerged portions of the conti-
nents that surround all the continental areas of the earth. The outer edge of the shelf
ends when the slope of the sea floor increases sharply. An abrupt drop in depth usu-
ally occurs when the water reaches 100 fathoms (600 feet). The total area of the Con-
tinental Shelf off the United States, excluding Alaska and Hawaii, is about 290,000
square miles. H.R. REP. No. 215, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1953] U.S. CODE
CoN(i & AD. NEws 1385, 1390.
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possessed ownership rights to the marginal sea.3 4
In 1947, the conflict culminated in United States v. California,31 the
first in a series of disputes between the federal government and the
State of California. 36  For the first time, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the marginal sea belonged to the individ-
ual states or to the United States.37 The dispute arose because
California had authorized through leases the extraction in the margi-
nal sea of petroleum, gas, and other mineral deposits. 38 Objecting to
this offshore program, the United States brought suit.39 The Court
34. The conflicting claims caused those favoring and those opposing state owner-
ship to introduce several bills in Congress, but none of them became law. During the
79th Congress (1945-46), legislators brought 19 joint resolutions, all favoring state
ownership, before Congress. These proposals granted to the states a three-mile zone
of submerged land off their coastlines. The government did retain, however, owner-
ship in those lands it had acquired previously by purchase, condemnation, and dona-
tion. One bill passed the House, H.R.J. 225, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), but was
vetoed by President Harry Truman. 92 CONG. REC. 10660 (1946). The House failed
to override his veto. 92 CONG. REC. 10745 (1946). Between 1937 and 1939, legislators
proposed a large number of bills that attempted to declare the lands seaward of the
low water mark to be part of the United States' public domain. See Metcalfe, The
Tidelands Controversy: A Study in Development of a Political-Legal Problem, 4 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 39, 41 (1952-53).
35. 332 U.S. 19 (1947). For a general background of the disputes leading up to
this decision, see Note, Conflicting State and Federal Claims of Title in Submerged
Lands of the Continental She#f, 56 YALE L.J. 356 (1947).
36. See note 9 supra.
37. 332 U.S. at 23.
38. California received large sums in rents and royalties for these leases. 332 U.S.
at 23. The court noted that the discovery of oil off the coast prompted the state to pass
laws authorizing California residents to prospect for oil and gas on blocks off its coast.
Id at 38.
39. The United States obviously desired control over these valuable resources.
The federal government also argued that federal dominion was necessary to protect
the country against dangers to security and tranquility of its citizens, and that the
United States has a responsibility to handle diplomatic relations. 332 U.S. at 29.
These arguments greatly resemble the concern expressed by President Franklin
Roosevelt in his two 1945 Proclamations.
California argued that its original constitution, adopted in 1849 before the state was
admitted to the Union, included within its state boundaries the water area extending
three English miles into the ocean. Id See CAL. CONST. art. 12, § 1. Since the
United States admitted California into the Union on an equal footing with other
states, 9 Stat. 452 (1850), California argued its ownership followed from Martin and
Pollard's Lessee. The court rejected this position, particularly the application of Pol-
lard's Lessee and Martin. 332 U.S. at 32-33.
California claimed three English miles; the United States claimed three marine
(3A5 English) miles. The court held that the United States possessed paramount
rights in the area extending three marine miles from the coastline. Id at 39.
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held that the federal government possessed "paramount rights in and
full dominion and power over" the submerged land within three
miles of the California coastline.4" The majority opinion emphasized
that the international importance of the area dictated federal con-
trol.4 The Court subsequently expanded its newly created para-
mount rights doctrine in United States v. Louisiana42 and United
States v. Texas43 by rejecting state-proclaimed boundaries which ex-
tended beyond the marginal sea. The Court concluded that the fed-
eral government's paramount rights applied to all submerged land
seaward of a state's coastline. 44
The SLA, passed six years later, overturned the 1947 Caifornia
decision45 by granting coastal states ownership rights to the marginal
40. 332 U.S. 804, 805 (1947) (the first decree). The court held in part:
The United States of America is now, and has been at all times pertinent hereto,
possessed of paramount rights in, and full dominion and power over, the lands,
minerals and other things underlying the Pacific Ocean seaward of the ordinary
low water mark on the coast of California and outside of the inland waters, ex-
tending seaward three nautical miles and bounded on the north and south, re-
spectively, by the northern and southern boundaries of the State of California.
The State of California has no title interest thereof or property interest therein.
Id at 805. The Court did not state that title to the disputed area vested in the United
States. However, then Attorney General Clark expressed in 1953 the view that para-
mount rights and full dominion signified a title interest potentially greater than a fee
simple. H.R. REP. No. 1778, 83d Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in [1953] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1415, 1419-20.
41. 332 U.S. at 35. The Court stated that "[t]he very oil about which the state and
nation contend here might become the subject of international dispute and settle-
ment." Id
42. 339 U.S. 699 (1950). Louisiana argued that under a state statute it owned the
water extending 27 miles beyond the coastline. Id at 701. Applying the 1947 Califor-
nia reasoning, the Court held that since the United States owns the marginal sea, the
ocean beyond the marginal sea, which is an equally important international concern,
must also be within the national dominion. Id at 704.
43. 339 U.S. 707 (1950). Texas argued that under Texas law its boundary ex-
tended nine miles from the coastline. Texas had an unusual claim to an extended
boundary because the state entered the Union not as a former territory of the United
States, but as an independent nation. The Court held that "as an incident to the
transfer of that sovereignty any claim that Texas may have had to the marginal sea
was relinquished to the United States." Id at 718.
44. 339 U.S. at 720.
45. The 1947 California decision upset many legislators. The states had exercised
dominion over submerged lands for nearly 150 years. Thus, they felt that equitable
principles called for Congress to give to the states what they traditionally were
thought to have: ownership rights to the marginal sea. 99 CONG. REC. 4361 (1953)
(remarks of Sen. Hollard). The stated purpose of the SLA, however, shows that Con-
gress did not ignore the federal government's interests. The purpose was in part
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sea.46 Congress allowed Gulf coast states an opportunity to establish
historic boundaries47 extending up to three leagues48 from their
coastlines. The United States, however, retains control over the Con-
tinental Shelf.49 The Act specifically states that it does not apply to
areas in the marginal sea occupied by the federal government under a
claim of right or a title interest. 50
Since passage of the SLA, no court has expressly considered the
"claim of right" provision. Numerous decisions since 1953, though,
show that the Supreme Court, interpreting related provisions of the
to confirm and establish the titles of the states to lands beneath navigable waters
within State boundaries and to the natural resources within such lands and wa-
ters, to provide for the use and control of said lands and resources, and to con-
firm the jurisdiction and control of the United States over the natural resources
of the seabed of the Continental Shelf seaward of state boundaries.
Submerged Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 31, ch. 65, § 1, 67 Stat. 29 (1953).
46. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1976). Many legislators strongly expressed a desire to
quickly pass the SLA. They worried that the United States would need oil for the
Korean War. Since state ownership of offshore oil wells already was established, leg-
islators thought it would be more expeditious to maintain state control. H.R. REP.
No. 215, 83d Cong., Ist Sess., reprintedin [1953] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1385,
1386. Legislators did not act in undue haste, however. Congress examined 40 bills on
submerged lands, 6,000 pages of testimony and exhibits in at least 14 formal hearings
before passing the SLA. H.R. REP. No. 215, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1953]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1385, 1385.
47. An historic boundary is the boundary of any Gulf coast state as such bound-
ary existed when the state joined the Union. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2) (1976). See notes
52-59 and accompanying text infra.
48. Three leagues equals about nine marine, nautical or geographic miles, or ap-
proximately 10 land, statute, or English miles. 363 U.S. at 9 n.6 (1960).
49. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976). Sections 1331-1343 of the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act relates to submerged land in the outer Continental Shelf. President Harry
Truman's 1945 Proclamation No. 2667 foreshadowed enactment of §§ 1331-1343.
While the Proclamation referred only to control over the "national resources" of the
Continental Shelf contiguous to the United States, Presidential Proclamation No.
2667, 3 C.F.R. 67, 67 (1943-1948 Compilation), the SLA refers to the entirety of the
subsoil and the seabed. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976). Congress decided that the United
States may lease the outer Continental Shelf to private enterprise for the extraction of
oil, gas, and other valuable mineral deposits. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1334-1337 (1976). See
generally Stone, Some Aspects 0/Jurisdiction over Natural Resources under the Ocean
Floor, 3 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 155 (1970).
50. 43 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (1976). Congress excepted from operation of the SLA
lands to which the United States held lawful title, including lands acquired by emi-
nent domain proceedings, purchase, cession, and gift; and lands retained by or ceded
to the United States when the state entered the Union. Congress also excepted from
operation of the SLA "any rights the United States has in lands presently and actually
occupied by the United States under claim of right." Id
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Act, has subtly returned to the United States some of the rights ini-
tially thought to be surrendered. 5 In United States v. Louisiana,52
and United States v. Florida,5 3 for example, the Gulf coast states ar-
gued that their historic boundaries extended three leagues into the
ocean. The Supreme Court held that only Texas54 and Florida55
qualify for a three-league boundary in the Gulf of Mexico. In United
States r'. Maine," the Atlantic coast states argued that their owner-
ship rights extended beyond the marginal sea.57 The Supreme Court
reaffirmed explicit language in the SLA58 by holding that the federal
5 1. See notes 52-69 and accompanying text infra.
52. 363 U.S. 1 (1960). The United States sued Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Ala-
bama, and Florida. The federal government claimed that it was entitled to full do-
minion and power over the lands, minerals, and other natural resources in the Gulf of
Mexico between the three-mile boundary line and the outer edge of the Continental
Shelf The Court noted that the Act preserved the right of a Gulf coast state to prove
historic boundaries beyond three miles. To satisfy the Act's requirements, however,
the Court held that a state must prove it would have been entitled to the submerged
land under the doctrine of Pollard's Lessee as Congress conceived that doctrine before
the 1947 Califorma decision. Mere existence of such a boundary prior to the State's
admission to the Union is insufficient. Id at 24-36.
53 363 U.S. 121 (1960). Originally five state actions were consolidated in 363
U.S 1. The Supreme Court, however, reported the Florida decision separately.
54 363 U.S. at 64. Texas successfully established its historic boundary by show-
ing that as an independent nation prior to statehood, Texas' boundary extended three
leagues into the Gulf of Mexico. Id at 36. Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama
could not maintain similar claims. Consequently, the Court held that these three
states could not extend their boundaries beyond three miles. Id at 79-82. Seegener-
alr, Charney, Judicial Deference in the Submerged Lands Cases, 7 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 383 (1973-74): Lewis, A Capsulte Historv of the Present Status of the
Tidelands Controversr, 3 NAT. RESOURCEs LAW. 620 (1970).
55 363 U.S. at 129. Florida showed that its Constitution of 1868, approved by
Congress when Florida was readmitted to representation in Congress after the Civil
War. established a three-league boundary. Id at 123.
56 420 U.S. 515 (1975). The United States filed a complaint in 1969 against 13
states Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New
Jerse,. Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and
Florida Connecticut was not made a defendant, probably because the state borders
on Long Island Sound, which is not part of the marginal sea. Id at 516-17.
57 Id at 517. Each of the states, excepting Florida, claimed for itself, "as succes-
sor in title to certain guarantees of the Crown of England, . . . the exclusive right of
dominion and control over" all the submerged land extending to the outer edge of the
Continental Shelf. Id at 518. The states argued that they "acquired dominion over
the offshore seabed prior to the adoption of the Constitution and at no time relin-
quished it to the United States." Id at 519. See generally 5 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
580 (1975).
58. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976). See note 45 supra.
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government controls all submerged land between the three-mile
boundary line and the outer edge of the Continental Shelf.59
In the 1967 United States v. Louisiana case,6" the Supreme Court
decided that artificial jetties could not be considered a part of the
shoreline from which to measure the three-mile limit.61 The opinion,
in effect, moved the state boundary line toward the mainland. In the
1969 United States v. Louisiana,62 the Court held that the Texas
boundary line extends three leagues from the state's modern, rather
than historic, coastline.63 As the coastline continues to erode, the
boundary line presumably moves landward,' thus benefiting the fed-
eral government.
In the 1965 United States % California case,65 California asserted
that all waters and submerged land between its mainland and off-
59. 420 U.S. at 528. The Supreme Court relied on the 1947 Calfornia decision, as
well as the SLA, to support its conclusion that the United States has sovereign rights
over the seabed and subsoil underlying the ocean more than three miles from a state's
coastline. This holding has tremendous economic implications. The Court noted that
the outer Continental Shelf yielded from 1953 to 1974 more than 3 billion barrels of
oil, 19 trillion m.c.f. of natural gas, 13 million tons of sulfur, and 4 million tons of salt.
In 1973 alone, 1,081,000 barrels of oil and 8.9 billion cubic feet of natural gas were
extracted daily from the outer Continental Shelf. Id at 527. See generally 28 U. FLA.
L. REv. 231 (1975).
60. 389 U.S. 155 (1967). The issue was whether Texas could measure its three-
league boundary from the outer edge of artificial jetties-permanent harbor works-
or whether the boundary should be measured from the state's natural coastline as it
existed when Texas entered the Union in 1845.
61. Id at 161. The Court decided the SLA provided two types of grants to the
states. The first was an unconditional grant allowing each coastal state to extend its
boundaries three geographic miles into the ocean. The second was a conditional
grant allowing any Gulf coast state to extend its boundaries up to three leagues if the
state could prove its historic boundaries extended that far. Since Texas has an his-
toric boundary extending three leagues, the Court concluded, measurement of that
boundary must be made from the state's historic coastline as it existed when Texas
entered the Union. The artificial jetties were not part of the boundary when Texas
entered the Union; thus, they cannot be considered part of the coastline. Id at 157-
160. See generally Stone, Some 4spects of Jurisdiction over Natural Resources under
the Ocean Floor, 3 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 155 (1970).
62. 394 U.S. 1 (1969) (Texas coastline case).
63. Id at 5. Despite the holding in the 1967 Louisiana case that artificial jetties
were not a part of the coastline, the Court decided that under the SLA, Texas' coast-
line must be measured from its modem, ambulatory coastline. Id This holding
greatly favors the United States because the historic boundaries of Texas extended
farther into the ocean than the present boundaries do.
64. Id at 6 n.7.
65. 381 U.S. 139 (1965). Before 1963, the depth of the Pacific Ocean made it
impossible to drill for oil beyond three miles from the mainland. Improved drilling
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shore islands66 fall within California's control.67 The Supreme Court
decided California owns one strip three miles wide around each is-
land and one strip extending three miles from the coastline of its
mainland.68 All intervening submerged land, constituting the major-
ity of the disputed area, belongs to the United States.69
The Supreme Court in the 1978 United States v. California deci-
sion" inexplicably abandoned the pattern set in these recent cases of
either directly71 or indirectly72 interpreting the SLA in favor of the
United States.73 The Court stated that the SLA's purpose was to re-
turn to the states ownership of the marginal sea.74 Since the one-mile
techniques in the early 1960's, however, revitalized interest in the exact location of the
state/federal boundary line. Id at 139.
66. Some of these islands are as far as 50 miles from California's coastline. For a
pictorial illustration of the islands and areas claimed by each party, see 381 U.S. at
213 app.
67. Id. at 149. California argued that the SLA uses the term "inland waters" to
mean those waters the state historically considered to be inland when it entered the
Union. In California's case, that would be all the waters between the outer islands
and the mainland. Id
68. The Court noted that "[slince the Act does not define the term [inland waters],
we look to the legislative history." Id at 149. The Court decided legislative history
revealed that Congress intended for the Court to define the term. Id at 150. The
Court adopted the 24-mile closing line and semicircle test outlined in an international
Convention. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, openedfor
signature April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 519 U.N.T.S. 205.
Congress approved the Convention in 1960, 106 CONG. REC. 11196 (1960), and the
President ratified it in 1961, 44 DEP'T STATE BULL. 609 (1961). The Convention went
into effect in 1964 when the requisite number of nations (22) ratified it. See generally
Ereli, The Submerged Lands Act and the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone, 41 TUL. L. REV. 555 (1966-67).
69. Id This decision was a major victory for the United States since most of the
disputed area remained within the United States' control. See Charney, Judicial Def-
erence in the Submerged Lands Cases, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 383 (1973-74).
70. 436 U.S. 32 (1978).
71. See notes 52-64 and accompanying text supra. In each of these cases, the
Supreme Court looked to the SLA itself to find an answer.
72. See notes 65-69 and accompanying text supra. In the 1965 California case, the
Supreme Court had to look outside the SLA since the Act does not define inland
waters. Hence, the Court's holding in the case only indirectly interpreted the "inland
waters" language in the SLA.
73. This pattern actually started in the 1947 California case when the Court de-
cided that the United States controls the three-mile marginal sea off the California
coast. The trend continued in the 1950 Louisiana and Texas cases. See notes 42-44
supra.
74. 436 U.S. at 37.
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belts clearly are in the marginal sea,75 they are the property of Cali-
fornia. The federal government asserted that the Act does not apply
to "any rights the United States has in lands presently and actually
occupied by the United States under claim of right."76 The United
States maintained that it obtained a claim of right to the disputed
area when President Harry Truman used the paramount rights doc-
trine to enlarge the Monument in 1949." 7
The Supreme Court rejected the federal government's position78 by
citing legislative history79 to show that the claim of right cannot be
based solely on the paramount rights doctrine. If such a claim were
possible, the federal government could claim a right to the entire
marginal sea, thereby nullifying the purpose of the SLA.8° Finding
no other basis to support the United States' claim,8 the Court held
for California.
The Supreme Court failed to properly construe the claim of right
clause. Congress enacted the clause to enable the federal gqvernment
to preserve all of its installations and acquisitions in the marginal
sea.82 An installation refers to any specific area used by the govern-
ment for a specific purpose.83 The Channel Islands National Monu-
75. See note 12 supra.
76. 436 U.S. at 38. Senator Cordon noted in debates over the SLA that the claim
of right "leaves the question of whether it is a good claim exactly where it was before.
This is simply an exception by the United States of a voluntary release of its claim,
whatever it is. It does not, in anywise, validate the claim or prejudice it." Hearings
before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs on S.J Res. 13, S. 294, S. 107
S. 107Amend, andS.J Res. 18, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1322 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
1953 Hearings]. The claim is simply left for eventual adjudication. Id
77. 436 U.S. at 40.
78. Id at 41.
79. Congress pointed out that the "exceptions spelled out [§ 1313] do not in any-
wise include any claim resting solely on the doctrine of 'paramount rights' enunciated
by the Supreme Court with respect to the Federal Government's status in the areas
beyond inland waters and mean low tide." S. REP. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 20
(1953).
80. 436 U.S. at 41. Senator Long stated at the hearings that "I am a little bit
afraid of that last clause [referring to the claim of right clause] myself, just on the
theory that the clause might be susceptible of interpretation that would complete [sic]
negate this entire bill." 1953 Hearings, supra note 76.
81. 436 U.S. at 41.
82. The clause was added at the suggestion of the Attorney General whose pur-
pose was to guarantee "that all installations and acquisitions of the federal govern-
ment within such area [three-mile zone] belong to it." 1953 Hearings, supra note 76,
at 935 (letter from Attorney General Brownell).
83. Id at 1322. Senator Cordon stated that occupancy under a claim of right was
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ment is a designated area" established by the federal government to
preserve marine life and fossil formations. 5 The Monument is a fed-
eral installation which should entitle the United States to a claim of
right.
Before 1949, the federal government held a general claim to the
disputed waters under the paramount rights doctrine. The 1949 Pres-
idential Proclamation changed the government's general claim into a
specific claim. While the SLA extinguished general claims,8 6 Con-
gress intended to keep alive any specific claims the United States
might have in the marginal sea.87
Legislative history clearly shows, as the Court pointed out, that a
claim based solely on the paramount rights doctrine is inadequate. 88
The Court holds, however, that a claim of right, no matter how spe-
cific. is inadequate if it originated under the paramount rights doc-
trine. 9 Nothing in the legislative history supports this conclusion.9"
It is doubtful the federal government retains any specific claims today
that were not originally general claims.9' Consequently, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the SLA renders the claim of right clause
virtually meaningless.
The 1978 Calfornia holding raises a serious question about the
preservation of underwater life around the two disputed islands.92
"some sort of actual either continuous possession or possession in such a way as to
indicate that the individual claims some special right there different from a vast unoc-
cupied area." See 99 CONG. REC. 2619 (1953).
84 See note 16 supra.
85. See notes 14-17 supra.
86 See note 79 supra.
87. 99 CONG. REC. 2619 (1953) (remarks of Sen. Cordon).
88 See note 79 supra.
89 436 U.S. at 4 1. Although this is not the narrow holding of the case, the dissent
points out that it is, in effect, the logical implication to be drawn from the Court's
analysis. Id at 47.
90 See 99 CONG. REc, 2619 (1953) (remarks of Sen. Holland).
91 Before the federal government could establish a specific interest and occu-
pancy in an area, it most likely would have had a general interest in that area. See
1i5 Hearings, supra note 76, at 1321 (remarks of Senators Kuchel and Cordon).
92. Federal regulations applicable to the monument prohibited tampering with
.'any underwater growth or formation" and did not allow any person to "dig in the
bottom, or in any other way injure or impair the natural beauty of the underwater
scene " 36 C.F.R. § 784 (1977). The regulations also prohibited tampering with
,xrecks and regulate fishing. Since these are federal regulations, however, they only
apply as long as the federal government has jurisdiction over the area. The Supreme
Court holding removed this jurisdiction.
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Evidence suggests that removal of the kelp will seriously jeopardize
the continued well-being of this marine sanctuary. 3 The Court
should have eliminated the potential problem by recognizing the gov-
ernment's specific claim to the area.
The Court's holding also threatens the extraordinary marine life94
found around the Dry Tortugas Islands, located off Key West, Flor-
ida. A 1935 Presidential Proclamation,95 designed to protect the
marine life,96 designated these islands and the waters immediately
around them as the Fort Jefferson National Monument. The
Supreme Court recently declared that the waters around the islands
are part of Florida's marginal sea.97 Consequently, the 1978 Calfor-
nia case strongly suggests that the federal government, if challenged
in court, will have to relinquish control over the waters around the
Fort Jefferson National Monument.
Few areas in the marginal sea are like the Fort Jefferson National
Monument or the Channel Islands National Monument.9" There-
fore, a holding for the United States would not have circumvented
the SLA's primary purpose of returning ownership rights in the mar-
ginal sea to the states. Rather, it 'vould have followed the Act's claim
of right clause. The Court's decision does not satisfy the purpose of
either the 1949 Presidential Proclamation or the SLA's claim of right
93. Letter from C. Persons, Acting Regional Director of the National Park Serv-
ice, to the Superintendent, Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks, whose juris-
diction included the Monument, stressed that "there is a general agreement here [at
the Monument] that the kelp beds are essential for wildlife protection and should not
be disturbed." (July 20, 1950).
94. The waters contain several varieties of turtles, fish, and fossil formations. Let-
ter from J.A. King, Secretary of the Interior, to President Harry Truman (July 2,
1948).
95. Presidential Proclamation No. 2112, 49 Stat. 3430 (1935).
96. When President Truman was considering expanding the Channel Islands Na-
tional Monument, a letter from the Secretary of the Interior advised the President that
"similar protection was given to the extraordinary marine life in the immediate vicin-
ity of the Dry Tortugas group of islands." Letter from J.A. King, Secretary of the
Interior, to President Harry Truman (July 2, 1948). Also, the National Park Service
promulgated regulations restricting fishing activity in the waters around the Monu-
ment. 4 Fed. Reg. 4958 (1939).
97. United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531 (1975), decree entered, 425 U.S. 791
(1976).
98. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976).
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provision. A holding for the United States would have supported
both these purposes.
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